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Abstract
This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between agents who can
inuence their survival probability through private health spending, but who di¤er in
their attitude towards the risks involved in the lotteries of life to be chosen. For that
purpose, a two-period model is developed, where agentspreferences on lotteries of life
can be represented by a mean and variance utility function allowing, unlike the expected
utility form, some sensitivity to what Allais (1953) calls the dispersion of psychological
values. It is shown that if agents ignore the impact of their health spending on the
return of their savings, the decentralization of the rst-best utilitarian optimum requires
intergroup lump-sum transfers and group-specic taxes on health spending. Under asym-
metric information, we nd that subsidizing health expenditures may be optimal as a
way to solve the incentive problem.
Keywords: longevity, risk, lotteries of life, non-expected utility theory, moments of
utility theory, health spending.
JEL codes: D81, H21, I12, I18, J18.
1 Introduction
Whereas human longevity depends on factors of various natures - genetic, environmental
or sociocultural -, a large demographic literature also emphasizes the crucial inuence
of the individualslifestyles on their longevity.1 Clearly, how long one lives is not inde-
pendent from how one lives. Individual longevity depends on the extent to which one is
willing to make an e¤ortto improve or preserve his health, and di¤erences in the amount
of e¤orts carried out by individuals tend to be reected by longevity di¤erentials.2
What should a utilitarian government do in front of such a heterogeneity of lifestyles
and longevities? The answer clearly depends on the source of the heterogeneity and on
whether longevity is exogenous or not. However, it also depends crucially on the form
of the individuals preferences. For instance, Bommier et al. (2007 a,b) show that if
longevity depends on exogenous health endowments, it is optimal to redistribute from
short-lived toward long-lived individuals only when individuals have additively separable
preferences, while relaxing this latter assumption, agents should be compensated for their
poor longevity. As they explain in their work, assuming additively separable preferences
leads to an implicit assumption of net risk neutrality toward the length of life which leads
to strong (and disputable) conclusions in terms of redistribution.3
Starting from the works of Bommier et al. (2007 a,b), we might, on the opposite,
examine the redistributive consequences of another potential source of heterogeneity
in preferences: the attitude of agents towards risk and, more precisely, towards risk
on longevity. This source of heterogeneity is generally ignored since most economic
models assume both expected utility and additive lifetime welfare which, as we already
mentioned, presupposes that all agents exhibit risk-neutrality with respect to the length
of life.4 But it is not di¢ cult to see that the attitude towards risk plays a crucial role
here, so that assuming a generalized net risk-neutrality with respect to longevity is a
1See Vallin et al (2002).
2Health-improving e¤orts can take various forms: the e¤ort can be either temporal (e.g. physical
activity, see Surault 1996 and Kaplan et al. 1987), physical (e.g. abstinence of food, see Solomon and
Manson, 1997), or monetary (e.g. health services, see Poikolainen and Eskola, 1986).
3See Bommier (2005) on the notion of risk neutrality toward the length of life.
4One of such models is Leroux (2007).
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quite strong postulate.
Clearly, when an individual chooses how much to invest in his health, he does not
choose a certain length of life, but, rather, expresses a preference for a particular lottery
of life, whose di¤erent scenarii involve di¤erent lengths of life.5 The chosen level of
health-improving e¤ort will not be a guarantee of a longer life, but only of a longer
expected length of life with also some possible consequences on the variance of the length
of life.6 Thus, in the context of risk about the length of life, individual choices of health-
improving e¤orts may reect their attitudes towards risk about the length of life, so that
the making of a uniform assumption on the attitude towards risk may oversimplify the
problem of the optimal public intervention.
Let us illustrate this with the following example (see Figure 1). A person of age 50,
who has a disease, can choose between two possible lotteries of life: either lottery A, no
medical treatment, or lottery B, medical treatment(assumed to be costless).7 Under
no medical treatment, the patient is certain to live the next 10 years for sure, but not
longer. On the contrary, under the medical treatment, the patient can die during the
intervention with a probability 1/2, but can, if the intervention is a success, live until
the age of 70 years with a probability 1/2. What will the patient choose?
It is not straightforward to see what the patient will decide. Actually, each lottery
exhibits the same expected length of life, equal to 60 years, but di¤erent degrees of risk
about the length of life: whereas lottery A is risk-free, lottery B is risky regarding the
length of life.8
5Strictly speaking, we should talk of a lottery on the length of life rather than of a lottery of life.
6To be precise, the chosen level of health-improving e¤ort is likely to inuence the dispersion of the
ages at death.
7Consumptions per life-period are assumed to be the same under the two lotteries.
8Note that, in general, the choice of an e¤ort level inuences not only the expected length of life and
the variance of the age at death but also per period utility.
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A dilemma faced by a patient of age 50.
Lottery A: no health treatment Lottery B: health treatment
Probability = 1 Probability = 1/2 Probability = 1/2
    Death at age 60                           Death at age 50            Death at age 70
(= immediate death)
Choice between two lotteries of life
Under net risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life, a patient would be to-
tally indi¤erent between lotteries A and B, and would toss a coin to decide whether he
will undergo the medical treatment or not. However, such an indi¤erence is highly un-
likely, because the degree of risk about the length of life is a non-neutral information for
decision-makers. Thus, it is likely that individuals di¤er largely regarding their attitude
towards risk, and do not all exhibit risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life. Ob-
viously, some patients, who are risk-averse with respect to the length of life, will choose
no medical treatment (lottery A), while some others, who are risk-lover, will choose
the medical treatment (lottery B).9 As this example illustrates, the observed inequality
in health-inuencing e¤orts is likely to reect the heterogeneity of preferences, and, in
particular, the heterogeneity of individual attitudes towards risk. But this raises the
di¢ cult question of the optimal public policy in that context: what should a utilitarian
government do in front of such a heterogeneity in the attitude towards risk?
The goal of this paper is to examine the optimal public policy in an economy where
agents can inuence their survival by exerting some monetary e¤ort, but di¤er in their
attitude towards risk with respect to the length of life. For simplicity, we assume that
individuals live for a maximum of two periods, the rst one being certain while the
second one is conditional on survival. Naturally, by choosing their health expenditures,
agents choose a specic lottery of life, which reects their attitude toward risk.
9Alternatively, if the treatment had the virtue not to raise, but to reduce the variance of the age at
death, risk-averse agents would ceteris paribus opt for the treatment.
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So as to account for individuals attitude toward risk on longevity, we model in-
dividual preferences using a mean and varianceutility function, and we assume that
individuals have di¤erent sensitivities to the variance of lifetime welfare.10 As this is
well-known since Bommiers (2005) work, there exist two broad ways to depart from
net risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life. One way is to relax additive life-
time welfare, as in Bommiers (2005) works; the alternative solution is to relax the
expected utility hypothesis. The former approach has the advantage to keep on relying
on the - convenient - expected utility theory, but su¤ers from a lack of intuition behind
non-additive lifetime welfare. This is why, in this paper, we prefer to keep additive
lifetime welfare but to relax the expected utility hypothesis. Thus, lifetime welfare is
still assumed to be additive in temporal welfare (without pure time preferences), but the
expected utility hypothesis is here replaced by a less restrictive postulate.
More precisely, it is assumed that agentss preferences on lotteries of life can be
represented by a mean and variance utility function of the kind defended by Allais
(1953) in his seminal paper. Actually, Allais emphasized that, given that the dispersion
of psychological values is the specic element of the psychology of risk(Allais, 1953,
p. 512), it follows that [...] even in a rst approximation, one should take into account
the second order moment of the distribution of psychological values(1953, p. 513).11
Moreover, it was also quite clear in Allaiss mind that [...] one cannot regard as irrational
a psychological attitude in front of risk that takes the dispersion of psychological values
into account.(see Allais, 1953, p. 520).12 We shall thus postulate a mean and variance
utility function, which is a simple generalization of the EU form accounting for Allaiss
intuition. Naturally, other forms could be chosen instead (see Stigum and Wenstop,
1983; Schmidt, 2004), but the mean and variance utility function has the advantage of
10Actually, the mean and variance utility form is a special case of what Machina (2007) calls the
Moments of Utilityapproach in non-EU theory, followed by Hagen (1979) and Munera and de Neufville
(1983).
11Original version: [...] même dans une première approximation, on doit tenir compte du moment
dordre deux de la distribution des valeurs psychologiques.
12Original version: [...] on ne saurait considérer comme irrationnelle une attitude psychologique
devant le risque qui tient compte de la dispersion des valeurs psychologiques.
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simplicity.13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
derives the laissez-faire equilibrium. Section 3 studies the rst-best social optimum and
its decentralisation. The second-best problem is considered in Section 4. A numerical
illustration is developed in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 The model
2.1 Environment
Let us consider a population of individuals who live a rst period of life (whose length
is normalized to one) with certainty, but survive to the second period only with a prob-
ability . This probability depends positively on some monetary investment m:
 = (m)
equivalently, m can be regarded as a private health expenditure made by the agent in
the rst period of his life, so as to increase his survival probability. We assume here that
agents have the same survival function (:) with 0(:)  0 and 00(:)  0. Note that life
expectancy equals 1 + (m).
However, agents are assumed to di¤er in their preferences. In order to introduce these
di¤erences in preferences, we assume that individual preferences can be represented by a
function having the mean and varianceutility form (see Allais, 1953), and that agents
exhibit di¤erent degrees of sensitivity to the volatility of welfare:14
Ui = ui   ivar(ui)
where ui is the expected lifetime welfare of an agent with type i, while var(ui) is the
variance of his lifetime welfare.15 The parameter i reects the sensitivity to the variance
13Moreover, that functional form shall, unlike the expected utility function, allow some risk-aversion
with respect to the length of life, even under additive lifetime welfare.
14Note that this function, although more general than the usual expected utility function, could still be
generalized by taking into account higher moments of the distribution of lifetime welfare across scenarios
of lotteries of life. For more general functions, see Hagen (1979) and Machina (1983).
15Note that preferences represented by a function of that form do not necessarily satisfy the indepen-
dence axiom, as the initial ordering between two lotteries may be inverted by a convex combination of
those lotteries.
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of lifetime welfare exhibited by a lottery of life. Under complete insensitivity, i equals
0 and we are back to standard expected utility (EU) theory. On the contrary, if i
is positive, the agent prefers, ceteris paribus, lotteries with a lower variance of lifetime
welfare across scenarios, while a negative i reects the tastes of variance-loveragents.
16
For simplicity, we shall, in the rest of this paper, concentrate on two types of agents,
who di¤er only in their degree of sensitivity to the variance of lifetime welfare:
 Agents of type 1, with 1 > 0;
 Agents of type 2, with 2  0 and 2 < 1.
In other words, we shall focus here on two types of agents whose preferences on
lotteries of life cannot be represented by a standard expected utility function, i.e. on
two types of quasi expected utility maximizers. However, the extent to which those
agents depart from EU theory varies across the types: type-1 agents depart more from
EU theory than type-2 agents.
Under a zero utility from death and additive lifetime welfare (with no pure time
preferences), the expected lifetime welfare ui is, for i 2 f1; 2g:
ui = (mi) [u(ci) + u(di)] + (1  (mi)) [u(ci)]
= u(ci) + (mi)u(di)
where ci and di denote, respectively, rst and second period consumptions of an indi-
vidual with type i. The function u is increasing and strictly concave.
In this two-scenarios world, the variance of lifetime welfare takes a simple form:
var(ui) = (mi) [(u(ci) + u(di))  (u(ci) + (mi)u(di))]2
+ [1  (mi)] [u(ci)  (u(ci) + (mi)u(di))]2
= [u(di)]
2 [(1  (mi))(mi)] (1)
16By abus de langage, it could also be said that agents with a higher i are more risk-aversethan
agents with lower i levels.
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The variance of lifetime welfare depends on second-period consumption and on the vari-
ance of lifetime, equal to (1  (mi))(mi).17 Hence, we shall, for ease of notation, use
the notation var(ui)  var (di;mi) in the rest of this paper.
It should be stressed that second-period consumption tends, ceteris paribus, to in-
crease the variance of lifetime welfare: the higher second-period consumption is, the
higher the welfare gain of survival is, and the higher the welfare loss from death is too.
Second-period consumption is thus a major source of welfare volatility.
However, the probability of survival (mi) has a non-monotonic relationship with
the variance of lifetime welfare. Actually,
@var (di;mi)
@(mi)
= [u(di)]
2 [1  2(mi)]
>
=
<
0() (mi)
<
=
>
1
2
Hence, a higher survival probability raises the variance of lifetime welfare if (mi)
is smaller than 1/2, whereas it tends to lower it if (mi) is larger than 1/2. Moreover,
given that @var(di;mi)@mi =
@var(di;mi)
@(mi)
0(mi), it follows that a higher health e¤ort tends to
raise the variance of lifetime welfare if (mi) is smaller than 1/2, whereas it lowers it if
(mi) is higher than 1/2.
Given that, in industrialized economies, the life expectancy is high and the variance
of lifetime is low (as the survival curve is close to the rectangular), we shall, in the rest
of this paper, concentrate on values of  larger than 1/2 for any level of health e¤orts.
A natural corollary of this postulate is that, when an individual spends more on his
health, he does not only increase his life expectancy, but reduces also the variance of his
lifetime.18
17Note that the variance of lifetime has a minimum at  = 0 and  = 1, and reaches its maximum at
 = 1=2:
18Note also that our focus on  > 1=2 has another intuitive justication. Actually, when  > 1=2,
individual welfare is increasing in life expectancy for any level of i, as one expects. To see this, note
that imposing @Ui
@
 0 amounts to assume:
@Ui
@
= u(di)  i [u(d)]2 [1  2(mi)]  0
which, under i > 0, is true for all levels of di if and only if (mi)  1=2 for all levels of mi.
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2.2 The laissez-faire
Agents of type i 2 f1; 2g choose rst period and second period consumptions, as well as
health expenditure so as to maximize their objective function subject to their budget
constraint:
max
ci;di;mi
Ui(ci; di;mi)
s.to

ci = w   si  mi
di = Risi
where lifetime utility takes the following form
Ui(ci; di;mi) = u(ci) + (mi)u(di)  ivar (di;mi) (2)
and var (di;mi) is equal to (1). We assume that savings are entirely invested in private
annuities and that Ri is the return of an annuity. The wealth endowment w is exogenous
and identical for all agents. Note also that there is no pure time preference, and that
the interest rate is zero.
Assuming actuarially fair prices (i.e. Ri = 1=(mi)), the laissez-faire allocation for
an agent of type i 2 f1; 2g satises the following conditions:
u0(ci) = u0(di)  ivard (di;mi) =(mi) (3)
u0(ci) = 0(mi)u(di)  ivarm (di;mi) (4)
where varx (x; y) and vary (x; y) are partial derivatives of the variance of lifetime welfare
with respect to x and y. Condition (3) characterizes the optimal saving decision. In the
absence of any sensitivity to the variance of lifetime welfare (i = 0 8i 2 f1; 2g), each
agent would choose to smooth consumption over time (i.e. ci = di 8i 2 f1; 2g), because
of the conjunction of no pure time preference, an actuarially fair annuity price and a
zero interest rate. However, under a positive i, ci > di 8i, since vard (di;mi) is always
positive; thus the sensitivity of agents to the variance of lifetime welfare makes them
consume more in the rst period. Actually, consuming more during the rst period is
a simple way to insure oneself against undergoing a big loss of welfare if one dies at
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the end of the rst period. Thus, concentrating consumption in the rst period is a
straightforward way to protect oneself against a too large variation of lifetime welfare
across scenarios of the lottery of life. Note also that the higher i is, the steeper the
intertemporal consumption prole will be ceteris paribus, because the more variance-
sensitive the agent is, the more he will use that trick to avoid big welfare losses. This
result is presented in the proposition below:
Proposition 1 If the market of annuities is actuarially fair, ci > di for any individual
with type i > 0.
Condition (4) characterizes the level of health expenditure chosen by the individual in
the equilibrium. Under traditional expected utility theory, this condition would collapse
to u0(ci) = 0(mi)u(di), stating that the optimal health expenditure is such that the
marginal welfare gain due to health expenditure (in terms of the second period of life)
should equalize the marginal welfare cost of such an e¤ort. However, under a positive
i, the marginal lifetime utility from health expenditure depends also on its impact on
the variance of lifetime welfare, which is always positive since we assume that (mi) is
higher than 1/2. Thus, under positive sensitivity to the variance in welfare, the level
of health investment is always greater than under expected utility theory. Note also
that in the laissez-faire, the individual does not take into account the impact of health
expenditures on the return of his savings, Ri = 1=(mi) so that the individual chooses
a level of health expenditures which is too high compared to its optimal level.19
We can now study the equilibrium levels of consumptions and of health expenditure
of individuals with di¤erent sensitivities to the variance in welfare. Our results are
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Provided the market for annuities is actuarially fair, the laissez-faire
allocation is such that
(i) if c1 = c2, then d1 < d2 and m1  m2 [or d1  d2 and m1 > m2],
19This result is highlighted in Becker and Philipson (1998). Actually, each agent tends to consider
that his own health e¤ort will not a¤ect the return of the annuity whereas at the aggregate level it does.
This is also emphasized in Sheshinski (2007, chapter 7).
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(ii) if d1 = d2, then c1 > c2 and m1  m2 [or c1  c2 and m1 < m2].
Note rst that, given the postulated general functional forms for u(c) and (m), it
is not possible, in the present model, to fully describe the optimal levels of consump-
tions and health expenditures for the two types of agents. Depending on the particular
functional forms chosen for u(c) and (m), agentss consumptions and e¤orts (ci; di;mi)
may a priori vary in di¤erent ways. We will come back on the importance of functional
forms in Section 5, where we present some numerical examples. This is why we shall
here equalize rst or second period consumptions between individuals so as to determine
how the chosen variables (ci; di;mi) di¤er across agents.
If rst-period consumption is equal for the two types of agents, then it is necessarily
the case that an agent who has a larger sensitivity to the dispersion of psychological
values chooses a lower second-period consumption and more health spending than an
agent with a lower i. The intuition behind that result is the following. For a more
sensitive agent, having a lower second-period consumption and spending more on health
is a rational way to reduce the variance of lifetime welfare since the potential loss (i.e.
second-period utility) would be smaller and this would happen with a lower probability.
Agents with a lower i do not have the same concerns, and thus choose, for an equal
rst period consumption, a higher second-period consumption and a lower health e¤ort.
If, alternatively, it is second-period consumption that is equal for both types of agents,
then, without surprise, agents who are more sensitive to the variance will consume more
in the rst period in comparison to less-variance-sensitive agents, so that, given the
budget constraint faced, they will also invest less in health in comparison with agents
with a lower i. That result is not surprising, as consuming more in the rst period is
a standard way to insure oneself against a too large volatility of lifetime welfare.
Thus, one cannot say, under general functional forms, whether agents with a higher
i will spend more or fewer resources in health. A higher sensitivity to the dispersion
of psychological value may imply that an agent spends more on health (at the cost of
second-period consumption) or on the contrary, spends less on health (to favour rst-
period consumption). That indeterminacy can be explained as follows. The two ways
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to protect oneself against a high volatility of lifetime welfare are either to spend a lot on
health or to spend a lot in rst-period consumption. Which solution dominates depends
on the curvatures of u(ci) and (mi). If 0(mi) is large and u0(ci) is low, then agents
of type 1 will opt for the rst way to avoid lifetime welfare variance; on the contrary,
if 0(mi) is low and u0(ci) is large, agents of type 1 will opt for the second as a more
e¢ cient way to avoid lifetime welfare volatility.
3 The rst-best problem
3.1 The social optimum
In this section, we assume that the social planner is utilitarian and that he perfectly
observes individualstypes.20 The social planner can lend or borrow at a zero interest
rate in order to balance the budget at any given period. The resource constraint of the
economy is thus: X
i=1;2
ni (ci +  (mi) di +mi)  w (5)
where ni denotes the number of agents of type i 2 f1; 2g in the population. Thus, the
social planner chooses consumption paths as well as health investments levels for each
type of individuals in order to maximizeX
i=1;2
ni (u(ci) + (mi)u(di)  ivar (di;mi))
subject to (5).
The rst order conditions yield:
u0(ci) =  (6)
u0(di)  i
vard (di;mi)
(mi)
=  (7)
0(mi)u(di)  ivarm (di;mi) = 

1 + 0 (mi) di

(8)
Combining (6) and (7), we obtain the optimal trade-o¤ between present and future
consumptions; this is identical to our laissez-faire condition (3) when the price of the
20Note that the standard Benthamite utilitarian criterion exhibits various limitations in general, and
in the particular context of endogenous longevity (see Broome, 2004). Thus, it is used here on the mere
grounds of analytical conveniency.
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annuity is actuarially fair. Thus, rst-period consumption is still preferred to future
consumption in the rst-best. On the contrary, (8) together with (6) di¤ers from (4)
by a term  0 (mi) di. In the rst-best, the social planner realizes that the level of
health expenditure also modies the budget set. Indeed, a higher level of e¤ort mi
not only increases direct utility through higher survival but also decreases consumption
possibilities as  (mi) increases in (5). Thus, in the rst-best optimum, the social planner
induces the individual to exert lower e¤ort so as to limit the negative impact of mi over
the individuals budget set; this was not the case in the laissez-faire as the individual
was taking the annuity return, Ri as given. These rst results are summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 The rst-best allocation is such that, for agents of type i 2 f1; 2g:
(i) mFBi < m
LF
i ,
(ii) ci > di.
where mFBi and m
LF
i are the level of health expenditures in the rst-best and laissez-
faire respectively. We now turn to the allocation of consumptions and of health expen-
diture according to individuals types. Obviously, rst-period consumption is equalized
across individuals. However, considering (7) and (8), there is no reason for second-
period consumptions and health expenditure to be identical across individuals (since
i enters into those equations). A priori, it is impossible to rank health expenditures
and consumptions depending on individualstypes, unless some additional assumptions
are made. Therefore, we assume two individuals with types 1 and 2 such that one is
sensitive to the variance in lifetime welfare and the other is not and obtain the following
results:21
Proposition 4 Consider two types of individuals with sensitivity to the variance in
welfare such that 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. The rst-best yields:
(i) c1 = c2 = c,
(ii) d1 < d2,
21This proposition is proven in Appendix B.
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(iii) m1 ? m2.
In the rst-best, rst period consumption is equalized across individuals while second
period consumption and health expenditures are di¤erentiated between individuals.
The individual with a zero sensitivity to the variance obtains a higher level of second-
period consumption than a variance-sensitive agent. This result is not surprising, as
second-period consumption tends necessarily to raise lifetime welfare variance.22 Given
that lifetime welfare variance enters type 1s utility negatively, it does not come as a
surprise that the social optimum implies d1 < d2.
However, it is not clear whether health expenditures should be higher or lower for
agents with higher sensitivity to the variance. This indeterminacy can be explained as
follows. On the one hand, higher health investment reduces the lifetime welfare variance
of variance-sensitive agents, which matters for those agents (unlike for agents of type
2), and, as such, is justied on the grounds of social welfare maximization. On the
other hand, dedicating more resources to the health of variance-sensitive agents has,
given d1 < d2, a smaller impact on the expected lifetime welfare of agents of type 1
than on the expected lifetime welfare of agents of type 2. Hence, whether m1 exceeds
m2 or not depends on which e¤ect dominates, and, thus, on the level of  and on the
shapes of the utility function and the survival function.23 As shown in the Appendix B,
if 1 is extremely large, one necessarily has m1 > m2, because the social welfare gain
from dedicating more resources to the health of agents of type 1 is here large (given the
extreme sensitivity of those agents to the variance of lifetime welfare) and thus largely
compensates the social welfare loss due to the lower second-period utility exhibited by
the life of agents of type 1. But, as we shall show in the numerical section, the condition
1 large is only su¢ cient (but not necessary) to have m1 > m2.
22Clearly, in the extreme case where second-period consumption equals 0, and u(0) = 0, there is a
zero lifetime welfare variance despite the risk about the length of life.
23For instance, if the utility function is strongly concave in consumption, we have, at the rst-best,
u(d1)  u(d2), so that the second e¤ect is minor and dominated by the rst one, leading to m1 > m2 at
the social optimum. Similar examples can be used to show the sensitivity of the social optimum to the
shape of the survival function (mi).
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3.2 Decentralisation
We now study how to decentralise the above optimum through a tax-and-transfer scheme.
In the following, we assume that instruments available for the social planner are a tax on
savings, a tax on health expenditures and lump sum transfers. We still assume that the
annuity market is actuarially fair so that Ri = 1= (mi) at equilibrium. The individuals
problem is then to maximize:
u (w   si (1 + ti) mi (1 + i) + Ti) +  (mi)u (Rsi)  ivar (Rsi;mi)
where ti is the tax on savings, i the tax on health expenditures and Ti is a monetary
transfer for any individual with sensitivity i. Deriving rst order conditions with respect
to si and mi and rearranging them, we obtain
 (mi)u
0 (di)  ivard (di;mi)
u0 (ci)
=  (mi) (1 + ti) (9)
0(mi)u(di)  ivarm (di;mi)
u0 (ci)
= (1 + i) (10)
Comparing these conditions with both (6), (7) and (8), we nd that the optimal tax on
savings is always zero for any type of individual, e.g. ti = 0 but the optimal level of
the tax on health expenditures i should be equal to 0 (mi) di > 0. This can be related
to Becker and Philipson (1998); by implementing a positive tax on health expenditures,
one limits health expenditures and make it tend toward its rst-best level. Note that
this tax on health spending is type-specic, that is, it depends on the degree of variance-
sensitivity i.
To explore how the optimal tax on health spending i varies with i, let us turn
back to the special case of Proposition 4, where 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. In that specic
case, we have, under a large 1, 1 = 
0 (m1) d1 < 2 = 0 (m2) d2, so that m1 > m2.
Otherwise, we have 1 7 2 if m1 < m2. We also nd that if m1 < m2, the level of
expected consumption, dened by
c+ (mi)di +mi
is always larger for type-2 agents than for type-1 agents. In this case, the rst-best
optimum transfers resources from the individual with higher sensitivity to the variance
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to the individual with the lowest one and T1 < T2. On the opposite, if m1 ? m2, the
direction of transfers is ambiguous and T1 ? T2.
4 The second-best problem
Whereas the above optimal policy discussion assumed a perfect observability of agents
preferences on lotteries of life, such a perfect observability is hardly plausible. Actually,
while a government would like agents to reveal their preferences (i.e. their i), these
may be tempted to lie on their type to benet from an allocation that better coincides
with their preferences. Hence, we need to relax the assumption of perfect observability
of types, and turn to the analysis of the second-best.
In order to simplify the analysis, we shall concentrate, in the rest of the paper, on the
two types of agents of Proposition 4: variance-sensitive agents (1 > 0 ) and expected
utility maximisers (2 = 0). A priori, the rst-best may redistribute from agents of type
2 to agents of type 1, or, the contrary, from agents of type 1 to agents of type 2, depending
on the functional form of the survival probability and the utility function. For instance,
refering to Proposition 4, it is possible that m1 < m2 at the social optimum, so that it
is likely that agents of type 1 will be tempted to pretend to be of type 2 (as c1 = c2
and d1 < d2).24 However, if 1 is su¢ ciently large, implying m1 > m2 at the social
optimum, it may be the case that variance-insensitive agents mimic variance-sensitive
agents. Therefore, we need to consider here the two possible cases.
The problem faced by the social planner takes the following general form:
X
i=1;2
niUi (ci; di;mi)
s:to
8<:
P
i=1;2 ni (ci +  (mi) di)  w
U2 (c2; d2;m2) > U2 (c1; d1;m1)
or U1 (c1; d1;m1) > U1 (c2; d2;m2)
In the case where type-1 agents are tempted to copy type-2 agents, the rst incentive
compatibility constraint is binding, and the second one is not (see Subsection 4.1). On
24But the mimicking behavior of type-2 agents is not certain, as a large second-period consumption
raises also the variance of lifetime welfare.
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the contrary, in the case where type-2 agents are tempted to mimic type-1 agents, the
second incentive compatibility constraint is binding, and the other is not (see Subsection
4.2).25
4.1 Case 1: type 1 mimicking type 2
The Lagrangian of the problem has the following expression
$ = n1 [u(c1) + (m1)u(d1)  1var (d1;m1)] + n2 [u(c2) + (m2)u(d2)]
+
24w   X
i=1;2
ni (ci +mi +  (mi) di)
35
+

u(c1) + (m1)u(d1)  1var (d1;m1)
 u(c2)  (m2)u(d2) + 1var (d2;m2)

where  and  are the Lagrange multipliers associated to, respectively, the resource
constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. Solving the Lagrangian and re-
arranging FOCs, we nd, for the mimicker (type-1 individual), the usual result of no
distortion at the top:
u0(d1)  1 vard1 (d1;m1)(m1)
u0(c1)
= 1
0(m1)u(d1)  1varm1 (d1;m1)
u0(c1)
= 1 + 0 (m1) d1
so that, comparing these equations with (9) and (10), second-best optimal taxes level
are
t1 = 0
1 = 
0 (m1) d1
As in the rst-best, savings are not taxed, while health spending are taxed in such a way
as to correct for the Becker-Philipson e¤ect. We also nd that the following trade-o¤s
25Note that one cannot exclude double copying. For simplicity, we concentrate on one directional
mimicking behaviour.
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for type-2 agents
u0(d2)
u0(c2)
= 1  
n2
1vard (d2;m2)
(m2)
0(m2)u(d2)
u0(c2)
=

1 + 0 (m2) d2
  
n2
1varm (d2;m2)
and taxes have now the following forms:
t2 =   
n2
1vard (d2;m2)
(m2)
< 0
2 = 
0 (m2) d2   
n2
1varm (d2;m2) > 0
Thus, in the second-best, it is optimal to subsidize savings and to tax health expenditures
for the type-2 agent. The rational behind t2 < 0 is that in a second-best, it is optimal
to encourage second-period consumption for the type-2 agent as a way to discourage a
type-1 individual from mimicking a type-2 (by doing so, he would obtain too high a level
of second period consumption). Regarding the tax on health spending, the incentive
compatibility constraint tends to reinforce the internalisation of the Becker-Philipson
e¤ect. This additional constraint prevents the individual 1 from mimicking individual 2
as individual 1 would not invest enough in health if he was pretending to be of type 2.
Our ndings are summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 5 Consider two types of individuals with sensitivity to the variance in
welfare such that 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. Under asymmetric information,
 The no distortion at the top result holds.
 A subsidy on savings is optimal for type-2 individuals and is equal to  1vard (d2;m2) =n2(m2).
 A tax on health expenditures for type-2 individuals is optimal and equal to 0 (m2) d2 
1varm (d2;m2) =n2.
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4.2 Case 2: type 2 mimicking type 1
We now study the case where type-2 agents mimic type-1 agents. The Lagrangian of
this problem has the following expression
$ = n1 [u(c1) + (m1)u(d1)  1var (d1;m1)] + n2 [u(c2) + (m2)u(d2)]
+
24w   X
i=1;2
ni (ci +mi +  (mi) di)
35
+ [u(c2) + (m2)u(d2)  u(c1)  (m1)u(d1)]
Note that the incentive compatibility constraint has here a simple expected utility form,
as 2 = 0.
Proceeding as before, we nd the trade-o¤s between two period consumptions and
between consumption and health spending for the mimicker (here individual 2):
u0(c2)
u0(d2)
= 1
0(m2)u(d2)
u0(c2)
=

1 + 0 (m2) d2

The usual result of no distortion at the bottom holds; for the individual with 
2
= 0,
the trade-o¤s between two-period consumption and between consumption and health
expenditures are equivalent to the rst-best ones. Thus, the tax on savings is zero in
this case (t2 = 0) and health expenditures are taxed in the same way as in the rst-best,
i.e. 2 = 0 (m2) d2.
Rearranging rst order conditions, individual-1 trade-o¤s are now distorted:
u0(d1)  1vard1 (d1;m1) =(m1)
u0(c1)
= 1 +

n1
1
vard (d1;m1)
(m1)
0(m1)u(d1)  1varm1 (d1;m1)
u0(c1)
=

1 + 0 (m1) d1

+

n1
1varm (d1;m1)
Comparing them with (9) and (10) of the decentralized problem, we nd that the second-
best optimum could be decentralized by implementing taxes on savings and on health
expenditures equal to
t1 =

n1
1
vard (d1;m1)
(m1)
> 0
1 = 
0 (m1) d1 +

n1
1varm (d1;m1) ? 0
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Let now study the level of these taxes. We nd that type-1 agents should face a tax
on savings. The intuition behind this result is related to the incentive constraint: since
agents of type-2 always prefer higher levels of second-period consumption, it is optimal
to tax savings of the type-1 agents in order to prevent the former from pretending to be
the latter.
However, the sign of 1 is uncertain and might be positive or negative depending on
the size of two countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, 0 (m1) d1 > 0 corresponds to
the Becker-Philipson e¤ect; as we already mentioned in the rst-best, imposing a tax
on health expenditures is a way to limit individualsinvestment in health and thus its
negative impact on their budget set. On the other hand, 1varm (d1;m1) =n1 < 0
and is related to the incentive e¤ect; in order to prevent mimicking behavior of type
2, the social planner would like to subsidize health expenditures of type 1. indeed, a
type-2 agent mimicking a type-1 agent would obtain a too high level of health spending.
Note also that if individuals could perfectly see the impact of their health investment
on their budget set, the Becker-Philipson e¤ect would be absent and in the second-best,
subsidization of health expenditures would be optimal. Thus, the overall e¤ect on the
sign of 1 is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of both the Becker-Philipson and
the incentive e¤ects.
Our ndings are summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 6 Consider two types of individuals with sensitivity to the variance in
welfare such that 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. Under asymmetric information,
 The no distortion at the bottomresult holds.
 A tax on savings is optimal for type-1 individuals and is equal to 1vard (d1;m1) =n1(m1).
 A positive or negative tax on health expenditures for type-1 individuals is optimal
and equal to 0 (m1) d1 + 1varm (d1;m1) =n1.
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5 A numerical illustration
Let us now illustrate our results by some numerical simulations. For that purpose, we
shall, for simplicity, remain in the case where 1 > 0 and 2 = 0.
Throughout this section, it is assumed that the temporal utility function u(c) takes
a simple constant-elasticity form:
u(c) =
c1 
1   + 
where  and  are preference parameters.26 As this is well-known, the intercept pa-
rameter  captures the relative importance, in welfare terms, of the mere survival in
comparison with utility from material consumption.27
The survival function (m) takes the following simple form:
(m) =
1=2 + m
1 + m
where  > 0. Note that this functional form satises the assumptions made in the model:
0(m) > 0; 00(m) < 0 and (m)  1=2 8m:
We shall use those following benchmark values for key parameters.28
parameters    w
values 10 0.83 1 10
Table 1: Parameter values
In order to illustrate the sensitivity of our theoretical results to the heterogeneity
of agentss attitudes towards risk, Table 2 presents the laissez-faire, the rst-best and
second-best allocations under various levels of preference parameter 1, while 2 = 0.
Regarding the laissez-faire, let us rst note that, as 1 rises, rst and second-period
consumptions for type-1 agents fall, and health spending m1 grow. This is in conformity
26That functional form is also used by Becker et al (2005). Note that  can no longer be interpreted
here as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion with respect to c, because individual utility function takes
a non-expected utility form under  6= 0.
27The parameter  can be estimated, together with other preference parameters  and i, from
empirical estimates of the neutralconsumption ow (making a person indi¤erent between a period of
life with that consumption and death).
28Note that the preference parameter  is xed to a strictly positive level to guarantee the non-
negativity of health expenditures.
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with the scenario (i) of Proposition 2 above: as the degree of variance-sensitivity grows,
agents reduce their second-period consumption and raise their health e¤ort. Note also
that, as expected, we have d1 < d2. In this example, variance-sensitive agents consume
less in the rst period, and spend more on health in comparison with EU maximizers.
At the rst-best, rst-period consumptions are equalized across all agents. Note that,
as 1 rises, it is socially optimal to raise m1 and to decrease m2. This result was not
guaranteed at the general level: as this was discussed in Section 3, two e¤ects are here
at work: as 1 grows, the reduction of the variance of lifetime welfare of type-1 agents
becomes more important for the social planner, but, given a decreasing d1, the direct
utility gain from investing in the survival of type-1 agents is lower. In the present case,
the high intercept  (xed to 10) makes the rst e¤ect dominate the second one, so
that a rise in the degree of variance sensitivity of type-1 agents leads to a larger health
spending for those agents.
1 0.01 0.1 0.5
Laissez-faire c1 3.19 2.60 1.62
c2 3.27 3.27 3.27
d1 3.07 1.90 0.28
d2 3.27 3.27 3.27
m1 4.05 5.64 8.12
m2 3.80 3.80 3.80
rst-best c1 1.46 1.29 1.03
c2 1.46 1.29 1.03
d1 1.38 0.78 0.006
d2 1.4 1.29 1.03
m1 2.42 3.59 5.32
m2 2.23 2.05 1.77
Who mimicks who 2! 1 2! 1 no one
Decentralisation tax on savings (t1) 0.0006 0.035
second-best tax on health (1) 0.0574 -0.018
Table 2: Sensitivity to gamma 1
Whereas there can be, in theory, a mimicking behavior from type-1 to type-2 agents
or from type-2 to type-1 agents, the numerical simulations carried out tend all to point to
a copying behavior from the variance-insensitive agents to the variance-sensitive agents,
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so as to benet from higher health expenditures. Here again, that result is driven
by the assumption of a high intercept of the temporal utility function (i.e.  = 10).
That high intercept means that it is survival that matters above all, so that type-2
agents tend to copy type-1 agents in order to benet from higher health spending at
the social optimum.29 Hence, in order to prevent EU maximizers from pretending to
be variance-sensitive, the second-best policy involves a tax on savings of type-1 agents.
Note, however, that the sign of the optimal second-best tax on health spending varies
with 1: for 1 = 0:01, type-1 agents health spending should be taxed, whereas these
should be subsidized under 1 = 0:1. That sign inversion is in line with our theoretical
discussions in Section 4: under a low 1, the Becker-Philipson e¤ect still dominates the
incentive compatibility component within the optimal 1 formula, while the opposite
holds for a larger 1.
Given the importance of the preference parameter  for the issue at stake, it makes
sense to explore the sensitivity of our conclusions to its level. That sensitivity analysis
is carried out in Table 3, which shows the laissez-faire, the rst-best and second-best
under  varying between 10 and -3.30 Not surprisingly, the laissez-faire level of health
expenditures tends to fall monotonically as  falls: when survival per se becomes less
important, agents tend to invest less in their health.
In terms of public policy, we can notice that, as  falls, there is a fall in optimal health
spending, and a rise in rst-period and second-period consumptions for all agents. As
far as the rst-best is concerned, it should be stressed that, as  falls, the gap between
m1 and m2 falls, as, for a given 1, the gain, in welfare terms, from spending more
in the survival of type-1 agents relative to type-2 agents decreases.31 Regarding the
second-best, it is crucial to notice that, whereas there is a tendency of EU maximizers
to copy type-1 agents when  is large, the opposite holds when  becomes strongly
29However, for 1 = 0:5, type-2 agents do no longer want to copy type-1 agents, as second-period
consumption for type-1 agents is far too low for type-2 agents.
301 is here xed to 0.1.
31 Intuition: the rst e¤ect (reducing welfare variance of type-1 agents) tends, as  falls, to become less
and less sizeable than the second e¤ect (related to the higher direct utility from the survival of type-2
agents), explaining that trend.
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negative. The intuition for this is merely that, under a low , survival does no longer
matter per se, so that type-2 agents do no longer want the high health spending of type-
1 agents. On the contrary, type-1 agents are tempted to copy type-2 agents to benet
from their larger second-period consumption, explaining the inverse copying behavior.
As a consequence, while the second-best policy involves the taxation of type-1 agents
savings and the subsidization of type-1s health spending when  is large, we observe
the opposite for  low.
 10 5 0 -1 -3
Laissez-faire c1 2.60 3.21 3.96 4.14 4.54
c2 3.27 3.60 4.07 4.19 4.48
d1 1.90 2.47 3.25 3.45 3.90
d2 3.27 3.60 4.07 4.19 4.48
m1 5.64 4.55 3.18 2.86 2.18
m2 3.80 3.22 2.46 2.27 1.82
rst-best c1 1.29 1.61 2.09 2.21 2.55
c2 1.29 1.61 2.09 2.21 2.55
d1 0.78 1.07 1.52 1.64 1.98
d2 1.29 1.61 2.09 2.21 2.55
m1 3.59 2.76 1.71 1.47 0.90
m2 2.05 1.77 1.26 1.11 0.72
Who mimics who 2! 1 2! 1 no one no one 1! 2
Decentralisation tax on savings (ti) 0.035 0.01 -0.0018
second-best tax on health (i) -0.018 0.03 0.434
Table 3: Sensitivity to the intercept value
For completeness of analysis, Table 4 shows also the laissez-faire, the rst-best and
second-best optima for di¤erent values of the preference parameter .32 Here again,
it appears that the most plausible case is the one where variance-insensitive agents
are tempted to copy variance-sensitive agents in order to benet from higher health
spending.33 Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the optimal second-best policy
involves the taxation of type-1 agentssavings and a subsidy on type-1 health spending,
which turns into a tax as  falls.34
321 is here xed to 0.1 and  equals 10.
33The reason for this is the high intercept  = 10.
34This sign inversion is due to the change in the size of the Becker-Philipson e¤ect with respect to the
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 0.83 0.75 0.6 0.5 0.3
Laissez-faire c1 2.60 2.95 3.47 3.84 4.93
c2 3.27 3.48 3.75 3.91 3.91
d1 1.90 2.11 2.27 2.28 1.91
d2 3.27 3.48 3.75 3.91 3.91
m1 5.64 5.11 4.46 4.11 3.38
m2 3.80 3.44 2.97 2.71 2.71
rst-best c1 1.29 1.43 1.61 1.72 1.98
c2 1.29 1.43 1.61 1.72 1.98
d1 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.55
d2 1.29 1.43, 1.61 1.72 1.98
m1 3.59 3.26 2.92 2.74 2.41
m2 2.05 1.95 1.80 1.72 1.56
Who mimics who 2! 1 2! 1 2! 1 no one no one
Decentralisation tax on savings (t1) 0.035 0.018 0.003
second-best tax on health (1) -0.018 0.003 0.024
Table 4: Sensitivity to sigma
Finally, Table 5 explores the sensitivity of our conclusions to the shape of the survival
function (m). For that purpose, we make the parameter  vary between 0.5 and 2. As 
grows, the productivity of health spending grows, implying here a fall of health spending
under the laissez-faire for all agents (but the fall is stronger for variance-sensitive agents),
as well as a rise in rst- and second-period consumptions. In the rst-best, the rise
in  implies also a rise in rst- and second-period consumptions, as well as a fall of
health spending. For each of the values of  under study, EU-maximizers are here
tempted to copy type-1 agents, because of the importance of survival per se. Hence, the
second-best policy involves a tax on type-1 agentssavings, as well as a subsidy on their
health spending (the Becker-Philipson component being here dominated by the incentive
compatibility component of the optimal tax on health).
incentive compatibility constraint. As  falls, the degree of concavity of temporal welfare in consumption
also falls, which reinforces the strength of the Becker-Philipson e¤ect.
24
 0.5 1 1.5 2
Laissez-faire c1 2.28 2.6 2.84 3.01
c2 2.98 3.27 3.47 3.61
d1 1.39 1.90 2.22 2.46
d2 2.98 3.27 3.47 3.61
m1 6.49 5.64 5.07 4.65
m2 4.50 3.80 3.35 3.04
rst-best c1 1.22 1.29 1.38 1.45
c2 1.22 1.29 1.38 1.45
d1 0.52 0.78 0.95 1.07
d2 1.22 1.29 1.38 1.45
m1 3.98 3.59 3.28 3.05
m2 2.21 2.05 1.90 1.77
Who mimics who: 2! 1 2! 1 2! 1 2! 1
Decentralisation tax on savings (t1) 0.060 0.035 0.023 0.017
second-best tax on health (1) -0.013 -0.018 -0.015 -0.012
Table 5: Sensitivity to form of the survival
In sum, this numerical application conrms the ndings of previous sections: the
form of the optimal tax and transfer policy depends on the degree of variance-sensitivity
of agents, and on the shapes of utility and survival functions. Whereas the case where EU
maximizers are tempted to copy variance-sensitive agents to benet from higher health
spending seems more plausible, whether health expenditures of the mimickee should be
taxed or subsidized depends on the precise parametrization of the model.
6 Conclusions
This paper aims at studying the optimal taxation policy in an economy where agents can
inuence their longevity through health e¤orts but who di¤er in their attitude towards
lotteries of life. For that purpose, we set up a two-period model in which the agents
inuence their survival probability by means of rst-period health spending. Moreover,
the heterogeneity of agents is captured by assuming that preferences on lotteries of life
can be represented by various sensitivities to the variance of lifetime utilities.
It is shown that, in the laissez-faire, a higher sensitivity to the dispersion of psycho-
logical value implies that an agent spends more on health (at the cost of second-period
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consumption), or, on the contrary, spend less on health (to favour rst-period consump-
tion). The choice between those two ways to protect oneself against a high volatility of
lifetime welfare depends on the specic functional forms for u(c) and (m).
At the social optimum, rst-period consumptions are equalized across agents, whereas
agents with a higher sensitivity to the variance should have a lower second-period con-
sumption. It is not obvious to see whether more variance-sensitive agents should benet
from higher or lower health expenditures, as, from a social point of view, the welfare
gain from reducing the variance of their lifetime welfare is to be compared with the
lower expected welfare associated with the survival of those agents (given their lower
second-period consumption). The social optimum can be decentralized by means of
group-specic taxes on health spending (to internalize the Becker-Philipson e¤ect) and
by adequate lump sum transfers.
Under asymmetric information, it is not obvious to see which form the second-
best policy should take, as the mimicking may occur from agents with a low-variance-
sensitivity to agents with a high-variance-sensitivity or the opposite. In the former case,
the second-best policy requires a tax on the mimickeessavings and a tax or a subsidy
on their health expenditures, as subsidizing health expenditures is a way to guarantee
incentive-compatibility in that case. In the opposite case, the second-best policy requires
a subsidy on the mimickeessavings, and a tax on their health spending. Whether it
is the former or the latter case that prevails depends on the intercept of the temporal
utility function. Numerical simulations emphasized also some other determinants of the
second-best policy, including parameters of the survival functions.
To conclude, it should be stressed that the present study, by focusing exclusively
on one source of heterogeneity across agents (their sensitivity to variance of utilities)
only covers one aspect of the design of the optimal taxation policy under endogenous
(di¤erentiated) longevity. Undoubtedly, other sources of heterogeneity exist, regarding,
for instance, the genetic background, the degree of rationality/myopia, the impatience
or the disutility of e¤orts. Hence, one could hardly hope to provide a complete answer to
that problem without considering what the optimal policy becomes when those various
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sources of heterogeneity coexist. To answer that question, a crucial point will concern
how those di¤erent characteristics are correlated across individuals types. Thus, in the
light of the di¢ culties faced in the present study where agents di¤ered in only one
aspect, one could hardly overestimate the problems raised by a more complete study of
optimal taxation in an economy where agents di¤er in several characteristics inuencing
longevity.
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Appendix
A laissez-faire: proof of Proposition 2
Replacing for the expressions of vard (di;mi) and varm (di;mi), expressions (3) and (4)
become, for an individual of type i 2 f1; 2g:
u0(ci) = u0(di)(mi) [1  2iu(di)(mi)(1  (mi))]
u0(ci) = 0(mi)u(di) [1  iu(di) (1  2(mi))]
Suppose now that 1 > 2. If c1 = c2 = c, we have:
u0(c) = u0(di)(mi) [1  2iu(di)(mi)(1  (mi))]
u0(c) = 0(mi)u(di) [1 + iu(di) (2(mi)  1)]
The rst condition excludes the cases where (1) c1 = c2, m1 < m2 and d1 > d2, (2)
c1 = c2, m1  m2 and d1 > d2, (3) c1 = c2, m1 < m2 and d1  d2. Moreover, the
budget constraint excludes the cases where (1) c1 = c2, m1  m2 and d1 > d2 and (2)
c1 = c2, m1 > m2 and d1  d2. Hence, it must be the case that m1  m2 and d1 < d2
or m1 > m2 and d1  d2 .
The part (ii) can be proven by similar reasoning.
B rst-best
We rewrite (6) and (7) for each type under the assumption that 1 > 0 and 2 = 0:
u0(d1) [1  21u(d1) (1  (m1))] = 
u0(d2) = 
0(m1)u(d1)

1  1u(d1) (1  2(m1))  
d1
u (d1)

= 
0(m2)u(d2)

1   d2
u (d2)

= 
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Combining rst two equations, one nds that d1 < d2. Using two last equations we nd
that m1 7 m2. In the specic case where 1 is very high, such that
1  1u(d1) (1  2(m1))  
d1
u (d1)
> 1   d2
u (d2)
for any level of di, one has that m1 > m2.
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